I~I~RODUCTION
The problem of explicating the meaning of natural language discourse and how this meaning is obtained has been of central importance to the study of philosophy since the time of Aristotle. This problem has continued to perplex philosophers, linguists, psychologists, and other academicians right up to this very day, such perplexity manifesting itself in disputes such as nominalism vs. realism, behaviorism vs. mentalism, logical positivism vs.
the "ordinary-language" approach, and structuralism vs. transformationalism. Basic to this perplexity has been the lack of an adequate set of tools with which to formalize meaning in natural language, resulting in a basic split between those who use existing tools to produce formalizations that are oversimplified and inadequate and those who attempt to account for the full complexity of natural language but, in doing so, abandon any attempt at formalization. Clearly, any move toward providing a more powerful set of tools with which to formalize the semantics of natural languages will have implications that will reverberate through a variety of academic disciplines.
A formalization of natural language semantics that is keyed to the computer will have a variety of very practical applications as well. Two decades of research in machine translation have failed to produce effective systems, chiefly because machines have not yet been able to duplicate the translator's function of understanding the material in the source language and then restating it in the target language. Once computers are capable of analyzing natural language to a depth where it becomes possible to mechanically determine equivalence of meaning in context of statements in two different languages, and capable of generating well-formed natural-language discourse from such an analysis, mechanical translation of scientific and other expository text will be straightforward.
Information storage and retrieval will also be much simpler once it is possible to store and retrieve information by means of statements, questions, and c~mmands in natural language--which requires, at least, that these natural-language inputs be interpretable as commands to the storage and retrieval mechanism. Computer-assisted instruction will not realize its full potential until student answers can be evaluated with respect to their meaningful content and this evaluation used to generate appropriate remedial instruction form a body of lesson information. And most importantly, a capability for meaningful analysis and generation of natural language will make computers accessible to people for an infinite variety of problem-solving applications in the way which is best Suited to them as human beings.
The thesis of this paper is that, as a result of recent advances of the state of the art in linguistics, computation, and their interface, we are on the verge of being able to formalize the semantics of natural languages for the computer in a manner that will be philosophically interesting, linguistically and psychologically revealing, and computationally useful in the manners just suggested. Such a formalization, it shall be argued here, may be based on the notion that natural language is basically explicable as a method of programming a particular kind of computer--a computer with a relational associative memory structure that is purposive and goal-directed in its actions, in the manner of a human being.
T~ PROBLEM
A. Requirements for a Semantic Theory
A Definition of Semantics
The term semantics is generally used to denote the system of relations between the expressions of a language and their meanings--in contrast to synts~x, which describes the acceptable structural forms of linguistic expression, and pragmatics, which concerns itself with the effects of communications in a language upon the communicants.
The term "meaning" here is to be analyzed in terms of its particular relevance to the act of communication.
An act of communication includes a sender who encodes a message into a signal (usually a string of phonetic or alphanumeric symbols), a channel along which the signal is sent, and a receiver who decodes the signal into the original message and interprets the message.
Meaning is the functional import of the message, which calls forth a re sponse--cognitive~ affective, and/or conative--from the receiver in the partfcular communication situation; it is a relation of the message to the receiver. Let us now make the simplifying assumption that this meaning is determined by the functional form of the message under some "standard" functional interpretation (this is basically an oversimplification, since the rules of functional interpretation, especially on the affective response dimension, will vary from receiver to receiver and even for the same receiver over time);
we may then define semantics as the explication of the relationship between the surface forms of linguistic utterances (as spatial or temporal arrangements of morphological units, which are the minimal linguistic units that have a direct functional relationship to the determination of meaning) and the functional forms of the messages they express. For a semantics to be formalized, this relationship must be sufficiently well defined to enable the processes of encoding and decoding to at least be formally explicable in terms of it, if not totally formalized within it.
The Semantics of Formalized Languages
The most successful attempts to formalize semantics have been for the formalized languages of the deductive sciences. Tarski, in his classic paper [43] 3 has set down a systematic method for formalizing the semantics of a formalized language, which is any language for which the set of meaningful sentences is defined by a formal syntactic grammar, all sentences are unambiguous, and there is a set of (syntactically defined) The Tarski approach runs into difficulty, however, in that it establishes only a single notion of truth, without reference to the different ways in which truth may be epistemologically established. This becomes critical when it comes to establishing rules of substitutability for "oblique" or "nonextensional" contexts such as quotation, indirect discourse, modal sentences, and belief sentences, in which the unrestricted substitutivity of equivalence does not preserve truth-value--one must here define types of equivalence stronger than identity of reference, which is the type of semantic equivalence defined in the Tarski approach.
It was mainly to deal with this problem that Carnap To fit the semantics of formalized languages into our general definition of semantics, which presupposes use of the language for the purpose of communication, we must introduce one more thing into the metalanguage, namely, the performative operators of asserting, questioning, and ccmmmading. We posit that the language L is being used to communicate between two information and control systems A and B, both of which possess inccmplete and/or changing models of L 2 corresponding to knowledge of some environmental situation over which both A and B can exercise 
3-Natural Language Semantics
We may now arrive at a set of specific requirements for a formal theory of natural language semantics by examining the crucial differences that are kno~m to exist between natural languages and formalized languages and noting the revisions and extensions of the formalized-language paradigm that are required to take these differences into account. This approach is indicated by the fact that the semantics of formalized languages represents the most highly-developed point of departure frc~ which to undertake a formal description of the real-world phenomenon of natural language semantics, and thus, if it indeed contains the potential of producing a description that fits the phenomenon, Thus, a message must refer either to a specific model, to a specific range of models, or generically to all models in which the specified intensions have nonempty extensions. Restricting the range of applicable models is accomplished in natural language through presuppositions, which indicate prior conditions that must be satisfied in a model for a given message to be applicable to it. Indicating generic vs. model-specific information, as well as "given" (for locating the appropriate model) vs. "new" (for adding to the model) information in the model-specific case, is accomplished through the subject-predicate division and through an extensive assortment of quantifiers. Furthermore, as Morris [31, 32] has pointed out, natural-language expressions not only designate but also appraise and prescribe--thus, natural-language intensions may take on as extensions not only objects, sets, and relations, but also values and actions. Natural-language intensions may also take on as extensions other intensions, thus giving natural language a "recursiveness" of logical order and a self-referential capability (which leads, naturally, to the classical logical paradoxes).
Intensional definitions are also more complex in their formal structure for natural languages than for formalized languages. The morphological structure of natural languages is also considerably more complex than that of formalized languages, as has been well recognized by contemporary linguists. The simple phrasestructure grammars that suffice to describe the syntax of formalized languages simply do not work for natural languages;
to dascribe the surface syntactic structure of a natural language requires a system, such as a relational phrase-structure grammar (Bellert, [4] ) or a complex-feature-symbol grammar, with the power of expressing the various relations of grammatical agreement among constituents. If the language to be analyzed is spoken language, the arrangements of morphological units are 5A full analysis of these generic determiners and adverbs, their logical interrelationships, and their relation to notions of probability is given in Celce and Schwarcz [131. A capsule summa~j of this analysis is presented later in this paper. and complete semantic theory of a language must be formulated in a metalaugua~e of higher order than the lsmguage being described.
But since the set of theorems of any deductive system must be recursively enumerable, and since there are subsets of natural languages sufficiently powerful to define any recursively enumerable set, any formalization of natural language semantics using a deductive logic (including the logic of computation) as a metalanguage will be incomplete in the sense that there will be questions about the language 6 that are theoretically unanswerable in the metalanguage (one could, however, go to inductive logics and probabilistic metatheories as the basis for a metalanguage ).
The epistemological limitation derives from the fact that, while formalized languages are uniquely defined, no two speakers of a natural language have quite the same idea of what their language is. It is clearly impossible, then, to formulate a semantic theory that describes all the speakers of a natural language.
6Including~ of course, any question as to the truth-value of a sentence expressing a logical paradox.
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Neither is it practicable to attempt an "ideal speaker-hearer" theory that purports to explain how native speakers of a language "generally" assign meanings to utterances and express meanings through utterances 3 since validation of such a theory would be next to impossible. A more appropriate goal, especially in light of the fact that the data for any semantic theory must ultimately derive from the use of the language for communication, is to construct a theory of a "typical speaker-hearer" of the language in question, whose validity would then derive from the ability of a physical realization of the theory (e.g., as a program running on a digital computer) to engage in successful purposive cCm~uni-7 cation with native speakers of the language.
Let us enumerate, then, the requirements for a formal theory of natural language semantics that have been indicated here:
1. The theory shall be couched in a formal metalanguage. 
B. Computational Avenues of Approach to a Semantic Theory
Since language is an instrument of communication and communication is essentially purposive, any semantic theory that one develops for the computer will of necessity be based, unless one is simply engaged in an academic exercise, on the purpose for which one I wishes to communicate with the computer in natural language. In this section several such purposes and the sorts of semantic theory they have led to or are likely to lead to will be described.
The purpose of oldest vintage is, of course, translation by machine from one langua£~ to another. The problem here is, given a discourse in one language 3 to produce a discourse in a second language that has the same functional import with respect to a model of the domain of discourse as the first.
Perhaps the reason that no efforts in this direction have achieved notable success to date is that the model of the domain of discourse and its functional interaction with the language have generally been ignored in the design of translation systems. The direction that will lead to a breakthrough here is that of developing domainspecifi___.____~e (rather thau langllage-specific) translation systems for well-understood and formally structurable domains of discourse such as physics and mathematics--once a fomnal model of the subject matter ~id a canonical procedural language for communicating with that model are defined, efforts can be directed toward specifying the decodings of as much of the relevant natural-language subsets as possible into the procedural language aud reasonable encodings of the procedural langaago into each of the natural languages.
Data management and infor,~ation retrieval is another purpose of -widespread interest. The domains of discourse to which these systems may apply may be arbitrarily broad or narrow; whatever the case, the requirements for formal structurability and a formal procedural language for storing and retrieving information in the data base are present. If the system is to do deductive question answering (or ~hat Travis [~5] has called "analytic information retrieval"), the system must be able to store and utilize the logical relationships among concepts and facts. The problem of specifying encodings and decodings here is simpler than for machine translation 3 since the user may make do with a fairly restricted natural-language subset for input, and natural-language output may be generated in a canonical form if it is in fact necessary at all. Thus it is possible here to get by with an oversimplified semantic theory, but for that very reason it can be expected that more progress can be made sooner with this than with any other approach (and this has, in fact, turned out to be the case).
Another purpose is the use of natural language to interface ~r'±th pictorial information.
Here the model is a set of logical statements describing the visual image, derived by the application of pattern-recognition operations to the visual image. The model, once derived, can then be either directly encoded into a set of natural-language sentences or else used as a data base for information retrieval. An alternative approach is to decode natural-language retrieval statements into search procedures on the visual image itself, performing the pattern-recognition operations, then, during the execution of these search procedures.
If the visual image is what a robot sees in its environment, the robot may not or, Sy be asked about what it sees but also told to move about in its environment and to move parts of the environment about~ thus 3 the intensional structure of the robot's message language will include a prescriptive as well as a descriptive dimension. As in the case of data management and information retrieval systems, the input language can be restricted and the output language can be minimal, thus obviating the need for sophisticated fornmlations of decoding and encoding.
The use of the computer to develop models of human thought processes is a purpose that can lend revealing insights into the nature of a semantic theory. Here one starts with hypotheses about the structure of human memory and the information processes that take place there, embeds these hypotheses in a computer program, and runs the program to determine the consequences of these hypotheses in terms of predictions of observable behavior. In terms of a semantic theory, the emphasis here is
• likely to focus on models, messages, and the pragmatic functions of messages on models; only limited attention is likely to be paid to the syntactic structure of the language, and encoding and decoding are likely to be formulated in a rough-and-ready heuristic fashion rather than in a way motivated by linguistic considerations. 8 Nevertheless, such models are an excellent way to test the workability of semantic ideas, for the models' linguistic poverty is compensated for in experimentation by their designers' linguistic flexibility--and once the innards are working right, they may serve as a basis for a more linguistically sophisticated formulation of decoding and encoding.
A purpose incorporating both analytic information retrieval and psychological modeling is computer-aided instruction with natural language. 9 The capabilities required here are to semantically analyze a student's natural-language response or question, to compare an analyzed response to a standard "correct response" to determine the logical difference if any, to generate remedial feedback in natural language by application of "tutorial decision rules" to the structure representing this difference, 8The one exception is models of linguistic performance, as discussed in Sehwarez [38] ; there, of course, linguistic considerations are paramount from the beginning.
9This approach to CAI is described in Bennik, Sehwarcz, and Silberman [6] .
and to answer a student's analyzed question and generate a naturallar~age reply. For natural-language CAT all the components of a semantic theory, except perhaps for encoding, must be developed to their full extent with respect to the subject areas to be taught. The linguistic requirements are not quite so severe as for machine translation, since the capability of dynamic interaction enables students to put up with a certain amount of rigidity on the machine's part and since the machine will not be required to analyze or generate long coherent discourses, but the requirement of thorough and complete logical analysis is more demanding here than in any other application of a semantic theory.
Finally, there is the purpose of enabling people to program the computer in natural language. Messages here are statements in a general-purpose progrsm~ning language which includes capabilities for defining both macros and closed subroutines; they will thus have both descriptive and prescriptive dimensions. Nouns, verbs, and adjectives will be decoded into either data items (if proper names, numbers, or truth values), primitive functions, macros, or closed subroutines, conjunctions and prepositions will decode into operators for combining program steps, adverbs will decode into designations of program sequencing, and quantifiers will decode into specifications for iterative loops. The decoding process will likely be some form of syntax-directed compiling, which exactly fits the decoding paradigm for formalized-language semantics, except in that the procedure may allow for a small degree of ambiguity. Encoding will either be completely standardized or else be defined in terms of a sublanguage of output specifications that may be associated in an arbitrary manner with computational procedures. All this assumes, however, that natural language is being used to program the computer in for small western cities?' produced a ten-item request 3 and the question 'For the smoggy high-income cities what is the ageincome value-range?' produced twenty separate procedural requests.
Although most of Kellogg's e~perimentation has been performed on a data base of census information, his system has also been successfully tier prostrated with airline-schedule and educational data bases.
If Kellogg's system can be f~Atlted as a semantic theory~ other than in its lack of a nontrivial formulation of encoding, it is principally in its failure to deal with certain of the requirements specific to the semantics of natural languages. Chief in importance among these are noneriterial attributes of intensions (except those quantified by 'some'), recursiveness of logical order, the appraisive dimension of language, discourse structure recognition, disambiguation by discourse context, and deviations from standard syntax.. 14 The logic of equivalence, entailment, and contradiction among messages, particularly on the intensional side, has also not been formalized to the extent that it could be.
In all fairness, however, it must be pointed out that few if any of the other current approaches to semantics have dealt with any of these requirements (except the last 3 for predicate-calculusbased systems) in a formally satisfying way. Kellogg has succeeded in putting together the best of current knowledge in linguistics, fomal semantics, and systems programming to develop an eminently usable formalization of English semantics for the computer.
Both the linguistic and the computational formalizations of natural language semantics, when looked at individually, can be seen to fall considerably short of the requirements for a i Thish last item# as well as undefined words and zemantic anomalies, is handled by Kellogg through appropriate feedback messages to the user. semantic theory that is adequate for natural languages. When taken collectively, however, they contribute an enormous reservoir of ideas and experience upon which one may draw in undertaking the formulation of an adequate semantic theory. With the addition of recent advances in linguistic theory, programming languages, and artificial intelligence to this reservoir, ~ may draw from it the elements that will combine to make up an adequate approach. Let us now look at one possible such approach.
AN OFERI~IONAL-MEANING APPROACH TO SEMANTICS

A. Methodological Basis
To arrive at a formal theory of natural language semantics, we must start from the set of requirements enumerated earlier-- actions that an operational semantic model will be able to perform will be computer actions and not human actions, and the evaluations that it will be able to make will a//nost certainly be pragmatic evaluations rather than aesthetic evaluations (this iS not to assert, however, that no way will ever be found to program a computer to simulate a human being's appreciation of poetry, art, or musi&). It is the descriptive dimension that is most With a bit of intuition, patience, and attention to the requirements of commutativity and associativity, one may also construct a heuristic "multiplication table" that will define products of these levels of possibility, to handle conjunctive and disjunctive attributions.
The most general possible explication of messages, and probably the one that will prove to be necessary for a semantic theory, is that they be simply any programs in the system. Other than performative operations and intensional evaluation operations, the set of operations that constitute messages will include finding an instance of an intension, creating a new instance of an intension, finding or creating an intension similar to a given intension, inserting or deleting quantified relations between extensions and/or intensions, comparing extensions or intensions for equality, inclusion, or mutual exclusiveness, adding or deleting intensional definitions, modifying intensional definitions, rearranging and otherwise modifying situation structures, numerical computations, and the logical operations indicated by the function-definition operators. The specific form of the language in which all these operations may best be combined into programs is yet to be determined, but it may well turn out to be similar to Woods' procedural language, in which the basic statement form is a quantified "pattern-operation" rule.
C. Decoding and Encoding
The process of decoding natural language consists of three stages: 
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The rules for lexical substitution can probably be formulated along the lines proposed by Gruber, those for encoding into nominal structures along lines suggested by Celce and Schwarcz [ll, 12] , and those for encoding into clauses and sentences along the lines suggested by Fillmore.
Both decoding and encoding may be formulated most neatly as nondeterministic procedures employing heuristic search and evaluation.
The rules employed in both, furthermore, are of the pattern-operation type, the syntactic structures they operate on are of the form of situation structures, and the semantic structures they operate on are, of course, components of models and messages.
Therefore both procedures and rules for decoding and encoding should be formulatable, and perhaps formulatable most elegantly, in the message language, since it is a general-purpose programming language containing all these features. Such a formulation would have the further advantages of parsimony with respect to computer implementation of the semantic theory and easy modifiability through the ability to use natural-language statements to effect changes in these procedures and rules.
D. Implications
The approach described above, though it has not yet been implemented, can be regarded as a sincere attempt to meet the requirements set forth for a formal theory of natural language semantics in the first part of this paper--an achievement that no other approach advanced to date can claim, despite the many valuable ideas these approaches have produced. Evaluation of this attempt as a semantic theory must, of course, await the satisfaction of the final requirement: that the proposed system, when progrmmned, engage successfully in purposive co~unlcation with speakers of a natural language. Simply as an approach that holds the promise of adequacy as a semantic theory, h0wever , it can provide a unifying direction for research in a number of areas, including linguistics, lexicology, logic, theory of computing, and artificial intelligence. The unification of such a diversity of directions of exploration, along with the rigorous test that the approach implies for an operationist theory of knowledge and meaning, should render the approach an interesting and fruitful one for philosophical study and exploration.
Adopting an approach such as this, or any approach satisfying the requirements for a semantic theory, as ~ metatheoretical basis would also help greatly to resolve the confusion that exists today in linguistic theory. This state of disarray is a result of the fact that, with a very few exceptions, linguists have basically ignored the fundamental fact of language as being a tool for communicating sc~ethin~ to somebody. They have almost without exception ignored the interface between language and the speaker's or hearer's model of the universe of discourse.
Operating in this sort of vacuum, linguists are under too few empirical constraints to determine any theory of grammar, let alone one that is meaningful. Only a semantic metatheory that takes the con~nunicational significance of language explicitly into account can provide a satisfactorily sound basis for a theory of gra~nar.
The exploration of the approach offered here would bear very much upon the interests of cognitive psychologists, too, in that it offers a unified framework for a theory of language and cognitive processing. The heuristic-search-and-evaluation mode
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of operation is the paradigm that has emerged from an extensive amount of empirical research on human thinking and problem solving; its successful extension to explicating the understanding and production of language would lend support to the view that the mechanisms employed in language processing are the same as those employed in human thinking in general. The specific forms of model and message structures would, conversely, provide a basis for a formal theory of cognition that would receive support from the linguistic side as well.
Finally, the formulation of the approach as a general-purpose programming system implies that it would be usable, in principle at least, for any application of computers to linguistic and semantic information processing, including all the ones mentioned earlier in the paper. Availability of suitable computer hardvare and operating systems would, of course, be essential to any application of the approach on a realistic scale. A more demanding requirement, however, is that of encoding the definitions of the thousands of different words that make up any natural language into an appropriately structured lexicon. A standard dictionary is one possible source of this information, but it will obviously not contain enough to define every word of a language operationally.
The work of Olney etal [BBS should be very helpful, however, in determining what can be gleaned from a standard dictionary and whether this information can be appropriately supplemented to yield an adequate operational lexicon, or whether a major new lexicographic effort, more rigorous in its requirements than any that have gone before, will have to be undertaken. Nhatever the case, the operational lexicon, once created, would be usable for all varieties of applications--and its construction, as well as the programming of applications, would be made 'easier by the capability implied by this approach to program the system in a natural language once it had been supplied with sufficient information to define the semantics of a suitable "base" subset of the language.
This approach, of course, is only one of many that might be taken to formalizing the semantics of natural languages. Like all other approaches that have been attempted or proposed so far, it will surely reveal its limitations somewhere along the way. But at a time when linguistics, semantics, and computational linguistics are all anxiously searching for a paradigm to follow, this may well be a fruitful one to try.
